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Abstract
Recently, Frazier et al. proposed a natural model for crowdsourced exploration of different
a priori unknown options: a principal is interested in the long-term welfare of a population of
agents who arrive one by one in a multi-armed bandit setting. However, each agent is myopic, so
in order to incentivize him to explore options with better long-term prospects, the principal must
offer the agent money. Frazier et al. showed that a simple class of policies called time-expanded
are optimal in the worst case, and characterized their budget-reward tradeoff.
The previous work assumed that all agents are equally and uniformly susceptible to financial
incentives. In reality, agents may have different utility for money. We therefore extend the model
of Frazier et al. to allow agents that have heterogeneous and non-linear utilities for money. The
principal is informed of the agent’s tradeoff via a signal that could be more or less informative.
Our main result is to show that a convex program can be used to derive a signal-dependent
time-expanded policy which achieves the best possible Lagrangian reward in the worst case. The
worst-case guarantee is matched by so-called “Diamonds in the Rough” instances; the proof that
the guarantees match is based on showing that two different convex programs have the same
optimal solution for these specific instances. These results also extend to the budgeted case as in
Frazier et al. We also show that the optimal policy is monotone with respect to information, i.e.,
the approximation ratio of the optimal policy improves as the signals become more informative.
1 Introduction
The goal of mechanism design is to align incentives when different parties have conflicting interests.
In the VCG mechanism, the mechanism designer wants to maximize social welfare whereas each
bidder selfishly maximizes his own payoff. In revenue maximization, the objectives are even more
directly opposed, as any increase in the bidders’ surplus hurts the revenue for the auctioneer. In
all of these cases, it is the mechanism’s task to trade off between the differing interests.
The phrase “trade off” is also frequently applied in the context of online learning and the
multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem, where the “exploration vs. exploitation tradeoff” is routinely
referenced. However, in the traditional view of a single principal making a sequence of decisions to
maximize long-term rewards, it is not clear what exactly is being traded off against what. Recent
work by Frazier et al. [9] makes this tradeoff more explicit, by juxtaposing a principal (with a far-
sighted goal of maximizing long-term rewards) with selfish and myopic agents. Thus, the principal
wants to “explore,” while the agents want to “exploit.” In order to partially align the incentives,
the principal can offer the agents monetary payments for pulling particular arms.
The framework of Frazier et al. [9] is motivated by many real-world applications, all sharing
the property that the principal is interested in the long-term outcome of an exploration of different
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options, but cannot carry out the exploration herself1. Perhaps the most obvious fit is that of an
online retailer with a large selection of similar products (e.g., cameras on amazon.com); in order to
learn which of these products are best (and ensure that future buyers purchase the best product),
the retailer needs to rely on customers to buy and review the products. Each customer prefers
to purchase the best product for himself based on the current reviews, whereas the principal may
want to obtain additional reviews for products that currently have few reviews, but may have the
potential of being high quality. Customers can be incentivized to purchase such products by offering
suitable discounts.
Other applications include crowd-sourced science projects, such as the search for celestial objects
or bird or fish counts: individuals may prefer visiting areas with reliable sightings, while the
principal would like underexplored areas to receive more coverage. In fact, even research funding
can be naturally viewed in this context: while individual research groups may prefer to carry out
research with good short-term rewards, funding agencies can use grants as an incentive to explore
directions with long-term benefits.
Frazier et al. [9] explore this tradeoff under the standard time-discounted Bayesian2 multi-armed
bandit model (described formally in Section 2). In each round, each arm i has a known posterior
reward distribution vi conditioned on its history so far, and one arm is pulled based on the current
state of the arms. The principal’s goal is to maximize the total expected time-discounted reward
R =
∑∞
t=0 γ
t
E [vit ], where γ is the time discount factor. However, without incentives, each selfish
agent would pull the myopic arm i maximizing the immediate expected reward E [vi]. When the
principal offers payments ci for pulling arms i, in [9], the agent’s utility for pulling arm i is E [vi]+ci,
and a myopic agent will choose the arm maximizing this sum.
Implicit in this model is the assumption that all agents have the same (one-to-one) tradeoff
between arm rewards and payments. In reality, different agents might have different and non-linear
tradeoffs between these two, due to a number of causes. The most obvious is that an agent with a
large money endowment (personal wealth or research funding) may not value additional payments
as highly as an agent with smaller endowment; this is generally the motivation for positing concave
utility functions of money. In the case of an online retailer, another obvious reason is that different
customers may intend to use the product for different amounts of time or with different intensity,
making the optimization of quality more or less important. Concretely, a professional photographer
may be much less willing to compromise on quality in return for a discount than an amateur.
The main contribution of the present article is an extension of the model and analysis of Frazier
et al. [9] to incorporate non-uniform and non-linear tradeoffs between rewards and money. We
assume that each myopic agent has a monotone and concave money utility function µ : R+ → R+
mapping the agent’s payment to the corresponding utility. The utility of an agent with money
utility function µ is quasi-linear: E [vi] + µ(ci). The larger the values of µ, the easier it is to
incentivize the agent with money, while an agent with µ ≡ 0 cannot be incentivized at all. When
an agent arrives in round t, we assume that his money utility function µt is drawn i.i.d. from some
known distribution F .
An important question is then how much the principal knows about µt at the time she chooses
the payment vector ct = (ct,i)i to announce for the arm pulls. In the worst case, the principal may
know nothing about agent t as he arrives. In that case, the payment vector ct can only depend
1To avoid ambiguity, we consistently refer to the principal as female and the agents as male.
2Both Frazier et al. [9] and our work in fact consider a generalization in which each arm constitutes an independent
Markov chain with Martingale rewards.
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on F . At the other extreme, the principal may learn the value of µt exactly. Then she is able to
precisely control the myopic agent’s decision by setting c accordingly3.
Reality will typically lie between these two extreme cases. Both financial endowments and
intended use can be partially inferred from past searches and purchases in the case of an online
retailer. This partial information will give the principal a more accurate estimate of the agent’s
money utility function value than what could be learned from the prior distribution F alone,
allowing her to better engineer the incentives.
We formally model the notion of partial information using the standard economic notion of an
exogenous signaling scheme [30]. A signaling scheme specifies how signals are correlated with the
ground truth, via a conditional distribution.
For each possible ground truth value (here: µt), the signaling scheme prescribes a distribution
over possible signals s ∈ Σ that could be revealed. Then, a known signaling scheme induces a
posterior distribution when receiving a signal: when signal s is revealed to the principal, she can
update her posterior belief of the money utility function µ from F to a more “accurate” F (µ|s).
The principal now has two goals, which stand in contrast with each other: minimizing her total
expected time-discounted payment C =
∑∞
t=0 γ
tct,it , and maximizing her total expected time-
discounted reward R. These two quantities in some sense capture the two objectives that must be
traded off: R is the long-term reward to be maximized, while C captures the loss in immediate
payoffs. There are two natural ways of combining these two objectives: The first is to maximize a
Lagrangian objective R− λC, for some constant λ ∈ (0, 1). The other is to maximize R subject to
a constraint on the total expected time-discounted payments.
Our Results
In Section 7, we show that in a certain sense, linear functions µ constitute the worst case for the
principal. Specifically, we show that for every distribution over functions µ and a corresponding
signaling scheme, we can determine a distribution over linear functions such that the proposed
mechanisms in this article perform at least as well under the original distribution as under the
modified one. On the other hand, we show that for certain MAB instances, the original distribution
does not allow strictly better mechanisms than the distribution over linear functions. The proof
relies heavily on the techniques developed throughout the article; however, it retroactively justifies
the sole focus in the rest of the article on the case that µt(x) = rt · x.
Let OPTγ be the optimal total expected time-discounted reward if the principal is allowed to
pull arms herself. We call a policy an α-approximation policy if it achieves at least an α-fraction
of OPTγ for every MAB instance. (Precise definitions are given in Section 2.) The main result of
this paper is to characterize the optimal way to utilize partial information of agents to incentivize
exploration from them.
Theorem 1 Let γ be the time discount factor. Given a prior distribution F (satisfying some
technical conditions) and signaling scheme ϕ, one can efficiently compute a policy TES and p∗(ϕ)
such that the Lagrangian reward of TES is a (1− p∗(ϕ)γ)-approximation to OPTγ . This bound is
tight.
Theorem 2 Given a prior distribution F (again, satisfying some technical conditions), signaling
scheme ϕ and budget constraint b, there exists a policy TES whose total expected time-discounted
3If she wants arm i to be pulled, setting ci = µ
−1
t (maxj E [vj ]− E [vi]) suffices.
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reward is a minλ{1− p
∗(ϕ)λ+ λb} − ǫ approximation to OPTγ , while spending at most bOPTγ in
expectation. This bound is tight.
In a sense, these theorems quantify the power of partial information ϕ about a money utility
function distribution F in a single number 1−p∗(ϕ)γ, via the approximation guarantee that can be
achieved using this signal. If this number is meaningful, more informative signaling schemes should
allow for better approximation ratios. Specifically, a garbling [26] of a signaling scheme ϕ is another
signaling scheme ϕ′ whose output is computed solely from the output of ϕ, without knowledge of
the true underlying state of the world. (A formal definition is given in Section 8.) In this sense, ϕ′
cannot contain more information than ϕ. Then, we prove the following theorem in Section 8.
Theorem 3 Let ϕ and ϕ′ be two signaling schemes such that ϕ′ is a garbling of ϕ. Then, 1 −
p∗(ϕ)γ ≥ 1− p∗(ϕ′)γ.
In Section 3, we prove the lower bound (algorithm) part of Theorem 1 by using the idea of
time-expansion of policies from [9]. The main idea there is to randomize between pulls of the
myopically optimal arm and the arm pulled by an optimal policy. Contrary to [9], we now have
to carefully coordinate the randomization and payment policies for the different possible signals.
This is accomplished by a convex program: the program is formulated predominantly as a heuristic,
designed to cancel out myopic reward terms in the objective, which are otherwise difficult to analyze.
In Section 4, we prove that this heuristic is surprisingly optimal. For the matching upper bound,
we use a class of instances called Diamonds-in-the-Rough [9], and show that the optimal policy using
payments can only achieve a Lagrangian reward of (1−p∗(φ)γ)OPTγ . We characterize the optimal
policy with a different convex program. Using the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions for
optimality of solutions to a convex program [24], we relate these two convex programs and show
that their solution is actually the same, thus proving worst-case optimality.
We remark on the computational considerations of the proposed policies. Given an explicit
representation of the distribution F and the signaling scheme, the convex program produces —
without knowledge of any MAB instance — a vector of target randomization probabilities q between
myopic and non-myopic play, as well as the optimal p∗. When an actual MAB instance is specified,
the algorithm draws on the optimum policy OPTη for a different time-discount factor η. When an
agent arrives, the principal needs to identify the myopically optimal arm and the arm pulled by
OPTη under a subset of the revealed information. Then, using the desired randomization, she can
easily compute the required payments.
Thus, the only computationally challenging part is to compute the arm pulled by the optimum
policy OPTη. This can be accomplished by the well-known Gittins Index policy [11], which com-
putes an index for each arm i based on the posterior distribution of rewards (or state of the Markov
chain), and then chooses the arm with largest index. Thus, the policy avoids a combinatorial
explosion in the number of arms, but computing the index of an arm can be non-trivial.
For the budgeted version, one first needs to find a suitable Lagrangian multiplier λ ensuring
that the expected payment respects the budget, and then find the optimum policy for that λ.
Finding λ requires analyzing the specific MAB instance and thus the optimal probabilities q are
not independent of the MAB instance any more. Theorem 2 is proved in Section 6.
Throughout this article and [9], it was assumed that the principal can observe the action that
the agent took, and base the payment upon it. In many settings, the principal may only observe
the arm reward that the agent obtained, but not the actual arm pulled. For instance, when the
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agent is a scientist, a funding agency may be unable to tell whether a scientific result was achieved
by deliberately following an ambitious agenda, or by stumbling upon it. In terms of the model, an
inability to observe the action means that the payment scheme can be based only on the agent’s
observed reward. In Appendix B, we show that in this kind of scenario, it is impossible to incentivize
the agent to pull optimal arms.
Related Work
The MAB problem was first proposed by Robbins [27] as a model for sequential experiments design.
Under the Bayesian model with time-discounted rewards, the problem is solved optimally by the
Gittins Index policy [11]; a further discussion is given in [32, 19, 10, 12].
An alternative objective, often pursued in the CS literature, is regret-minimization, as initiated
by Lai and Robbins [22] within a Bayesian arm reward setting. Auer et al. [2, 3] gave an algorithm
with regret bound for adversarial settings.
There is a rich literature that considers MAB problems when incentive issues arise. A common
model is that a principal has to hire workers to pull arms, and both sides want to maximize their
own utility. Singla and Krause [28] gave a truthful posted price mechanism. In [21, 25], the
reward history is only known by the principal, and she can incentivize workers by disclosing limited
information about the reward history to the worker. Ho et al. [18] used the MAB framework as a
tool to design optimal contracts for agents with moral hazard. Using the technique of discretization,
they achieved sublinear regret for the net utility (reward minus payment) over the time horizon.
For a review of more work in the area, see the position paper [29].
Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki [6] and Bolton and Harris [7] consider incentive issues from another
viewpoint. In their model, there are only two arms corresponding to two sellers and one or multiple
buyers. Both sellers can set a price for a single pull of their own arm. After each pull, sellers can
adjust their prices, and buyers can change their choices, which will eventually lead to an (efficient)
equilibrium.
MAB problems with additional constraints and structure are also studied in various settings.
Guha and Munagala [14, 16, 15] study a series of models with different constraints. In [20], for arms
defined within a metric space and satisfying a Lipschitz condition, the authors found an optimal
algorithm that matches the best possible regret ratio. Goel et al. [13] introduced an index policy,
similar to the Gittins index policy, with constant approximation for the time horizon constrained
MAB problem. Badanidiyuru et al. [4] investigated MAB problems with general multi-dimensional
constraints.
The role of information in markets was introduced formally by Stigler [31]. Subsequently,
Akerlof [1], Spence [30] began the study of effects of additional information, or signals, on the
market. For exogenous signaling schemes, Hirshleifer [17], Bassan et al. [5], Lehrer et al. [23]
explored the positive and negative effects on the equilibrium of different game settings.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Multi-armed Bandits
In a Bayesian multi-armed bandits (MAB) instance, we are given N arms, each of which evolves
independently as a known Markov chain whenever pulled. In each round4 t = 0, 1, 2, · · · , an
algorithm can only pull one of the arms; the pulled arm will generate a random reward and then
transition to a new state randomly according to the known Markov chain.
Formally, let vt,i be the random reward generated by arm i if it is pulled at time t. Let S0,i
be the initial state of the Markov chain of the i-th arm and St,i the state of arm i in round t.
The distribution of vt,i is determined by St,i. Then, an MAB instance consists of N independent
Markov chains and their initial states S0 = (S0,i)
N
i=1.
In this article, we are only interested in cases where the reward sequence for any single arm
forms a Martingale, i.e.,
E [E [vt+1,i | St+1,i] | St,i] = E [vt,i | St,i] .
A policy A is an algorithm that decides which arm to pull in round t based on the history of
observations and the current state of all arms. Formally, a policy is a (randomized) mapping
A : (t,Ht,St) 7→ it, where St = (St,i)
N
i=1 is the vector of arms’ states, Ht is the history up to time
t, and it is the selected arm.
To evaluate the performance of a policy A, we use standard time-discounting [11]. Let γ ∈ (0, 1)
be the time discount factor that measures the relative importance between future rewards and
present rewards. If a policy A receives an immediate reward of vt,it in round t, it is discounted by
a factor of γt and then added to the total reward. The total expected time-discounted reward can
thus be defined as:
R(γ)(A) = EA
[
∞∑
t=0
γtvt,it
]
,
where EA [ · ] denotes the expectation conditioned on the policy A being followed and the informa-
tion it obtained, as in [9].
Given a time discount factor γ, we denote the optimal policy for that time discount (and also
— in a slight overload of notation — its total expected time-discounted reward) by OPTγ .
We call the arm with the maximum immediate expected reward E [vt,i | St] the myopic arm. A
policy is called myopic if it pulls the myopic arm in each round. The myopic policy only exploits with
no exploration, so it is inferior to the optimum policy in general, especially when the time-discount
factor γ is close to 1.
2.2 Selfish Agents
We label each agent by the time t when he arrives. The Markov chain state St and E [vt,i | St] are
publicly known by both the agents and the principal.
In round t, the principal can offer a payment ct,i for pulling arm i. Incentivized by these extra
payments ct,i, agent t with money utility function µt now pulls the arm maximizing E [vt,i | St,i] +
µt(ct,i). If the agent pulls arm it at time t, then the principal’s reward from this pull is E [vt,it | St,it],
4We use the terms “round” and “time” interchangeably.
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and the agent’s utility is E [vt,it | St,it ] + µt(ct,it). ([9] studied the special case where µt(x) = x for
all x ≥ 0 and t.)
We assume a publicly known prior (whose distribution is denoted by F 5) over the money utility
functions µ. When a new agent arrives, his money utility function is drawn from F independently
of prior draws.
As discussed in the introduction, we show in Section 7 that the worst-case analysis can without
loss of generality focus on the case in which all money utility function are linear, i.e., of the form
µt(x) = rt · x for some rt. Therefore, apart from that section itself, we will exclusively focus on the
case of linear money utility functions. We then identify the distribution F with a distribution over
the values rt, which we call the conversion ratio of agent t. For the remainder of this article, all
distributions and signals are assumed to be over conversion ratios instead of money utility functions.
Lemma 4 For every distribution F over money utility functions, there exists another distribution
F ′ over linear money utility functions (i.e., over conversion ratios) such that the optimal approxi-
mation ratio is the same for F and F ′.
The definition of optimal approximation ratio can be found in Definition 8.
2.3 Signaling Scheme
We assume the existence of an exogenous signaling scheme, i.e., the signaling scheme is given as
input6. When an agent with conversion ratio r arrives, a signal s ∈ Σ correlated to r is revealed to
the principal according to the signaling scheme ϕ; Σ is called the signal space, and we assume that
it is countable. When the signal space is uncountable, defining the posterior probability density
requires the use of Radon-Nikodym derivatives, and raises computational and representational
issues. In Section 5, we consider what is perhaps the most interesting special case: that the signal
reveals the precise value of r to the principal.
Formally, let ϕ(r, s) be the probability that signal s is revealed when the agent’s conversion
ratio is r. In this way, the signals are statistically correlated with the conversion ratio r, and thus
each signal reveals partial information about the true value of r. After receiving the signal s, the
principal updates her posterior belief of the agent’s conversion ratio according to Bayes Law7:
fs(r) =
ϕ(r, s)f(r)
ps
, (1)
where fs(r) is the PDF of the posterior belief and ps =
∫∞
0 ϕ(r, s)f(r)dr is the probability that
signal s is observed. For each signal s ∈ Σ, let Fs be the CDF of the corresponding posterior belief.
As a special case, if the signaling scheme reveals no information, then Fs = F .
Throughout, we focus on the case when the posterior distributions Fs satisfies a condition called
semi-regularity (this is the technical condition mentioned in Theorems 1 and 2), which is defined
as follows:
Definition 5 (Semi-Regularity) A distribution with CDF G is called semi-regular if 1−xG−1(x) is
convex. (When G is not invertible, we define G−1(x) := sup{t ≥ 0 : G(t) ≤ x}.)
5When the money utility functions are always linear, F is also the cumulative distribution function of the slope.
6This is in contrast to the goal of designing a signaling scheme with certain properties.
7In Equation 1, if the support of r is finite, f(r) can be replaced by the probability mass function.
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Semi-regularity is a generalization of a well-known condition called regularity, defined as follows.
Definition 6 (Regularity) A distribution with CDF G is regular if G−1(x) · (1− x) is concave.
Lemma 7, proved in Appendix A, establishes that regularity implies semi-regularity, and hence
our result is more general.
Lemma 7 Let G be a CDF. If G−1(x) · (1 − x) is concave, then 1−x
G−1(x)
is convex. In particular,
regularity implies semi-regularity.
2.4 Policies with partial information
The previous definition we gave of a policy did not take information about the agent’s type into
account. In light of this additional information, we give a refined definition. In addition to deciding
which arm to pull, a policy may decide the payment to offer the agents based on the partial informa-
tion obtained from signals. Formally, a policy is now a randomized mapping A : (t,Ht,St, st) 7→ ct,
where st is the signal revealed in round t, and ct,i is the extra payment offered for pulling arm
i in round t. After ct is announced, a myopic agent with conversion ratio r will pull the arm it
that maximizes his own utility, causing that arm to transition according to the underlying Markov
chain.
The expected payment of the principal is also time-discounted by the same8 factor γ. When A
is implemented, the total expected payment will be
C(γ)(A) = EA
[
∞∑
t=0
γtct,it
]
.
The principal faces two conflicting objectives: (a) maximizing the total expected time-discounted
reward R(γ)(A); (b) minimizing the total expected time-discounted payment C(γ)(A); There are
two natural ways of combining the two objectives: via a Lagrangian multiplier, or by optimizing
one subject to a constraint on the other.
In the Lagrangian objective, the principal wishes to maximize R(γ)(A) − λC(γ)(A) for some
constant λ ∈ (0, 1). Here, λ can also be regarded as the conversion ratio for the principal herself.
Alternatively, the principal may be constrained by a budget b, and want to maximize R(γ)(A)
subject to the constraint that C(γ)(A) ≤ b.
2.5 Approximation Framework
Frazier et al. [9] performed a worst-case analysis over MAB instances and studied the (worst-case)
approximation ratio. In this article, we similarly perform a worst-case analysis with respect to the
MAB instances, while keeping an exogenous signaling scheme ϕ and the prior F fixed.
Definition 8 For the Lagrangian objective of the problem, a policy A has approximation ratio α
under the signaling scheme ϕ and prior F if for all MAB instances9,
R(γ)(A)− λC(γ)(A) ≥ α ·OPTγ . (2)
8A natural justification for having the same discount factor is that after each round, with probability 1 − γ, the
game ends.
9Note that all R(γ)(A), C(γ)(A) and OPTγ depend on the MAB instance.
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We say that α is the optimal approximation ratio if there exists a policy with approximation
ratio α and no policies have a better approximation ratio.
Likewise, for the budgeted version, a policy has approximation ratio α respecting budget b if
R(γ)(A) ≥ α ·OPTγ C
(γ)(A) ≤ b ·OPTγ . (3)
3 Lower bound: Time-Expanded Algorithm
In this section, we focus on the Lagrangian objective, and analyze time-expanded algorithms, in a
generalization of the originally proposed notion of [9]. In a time-expanded algorithm, the principal
randomizes between offering the agents no reward (having them play myopically), and offering the
reward necessary to incentivize the agent to play the arm i∗t according to a particular algorithm A.
In the presence of signals, the randomization probabilities for the different signals need to be chosen
and optimized carefully, which is the main algorithmic contribution in this section. On the other
hand, notice that if the posterior distribution of the conversion ratio conditioned on the signal is
continuous, then the randomness in the user’s type can instead be used as a randomization device,
and the principal may be able to offer incentives deterministically.
More formally, Frazier et al. [9] define a time-expanded version TEp,A of a policy A, parame-
terized by a probability p, as
TEp,A(t) :=
{
A(Sˆt) if Zt = 1
argmaxi E [vt,i | St] , otherwise
where Zt is a Bernoulli(1 − p) variable. Sˆt is the arm status that couples the execution of the
time-expanded policy and the policy A, which we will formally define later. When Zt = 1, with
the uniform agents defined in [9], in order to incentivize an agent to pull the non-myopic arm, the
principal has to offer a payment of maxi E [vt,i | St]− E
[
vt,i∗t | St
]
, where i∗t = A(Sˆt).
A time-expanded version of policy A with signaling scheme ϕ works as follows: at time t,
conditioned on the received signal s, the principal probabilistically offers a payment of ct,i∗t if the
agent t pulls the arm i∗t . Notice that only two options might maximize the agent’s utility: pulling
the myopic arm, or pulling the arm i∗t and getting the payment. There is a direct correspondence
between the payment ct,i∗t and the probability qs that the agent chooses to pull the myopic arm.
We will describe this correspondence below.
First, though, we discuss which arm i∗t the principal is trying to incentivize the agent to pull.
As in [9], it is necessary for the analysis that the execution of A and of its time-expanded version
can be coupled. To achieve this, in order to evaluate which arm should be pulled next by A, the
principal must only take the information obtained from the non-myopic pulls into consideration.
Formally, we define Sˆt as follows:
Define the random variable
Zt :=
{
0 agent t pulls the myopic arm
1 otherwise
and Xt,i = 1 if arm i is pulled at time t and 0 otherwise. Notice that Zt is a Bernoulli variable,
and Prob[Zt = 0] depends on the received signal s and the payment offered by the principal. Let
Nt,i =
∑t−1
0 ZtXt,i be the number of non-myopic pulls of arm i before time t. Using this notation,
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we define Sˆt,i to be the state of the Markov chain of arm i after the first
10 Nt,i pulls in the execution
history of the time-expanded policy, and Sˆt = (Sˆt,i)i.
Let Fs be the posterior CDF of the agent’s conversion ratio. Let x = maxi E [vt,i | St] be the
expected reward of the myopic arm and y = E
[
vt,i∗t | St
]
be the expected reward of arm i∗t . If the
principal offers a payment of ct,i∗t , then agents with conversion ratio r <
x−y
ct,i∗
t
will still choose the
myopic arm. Assuming that agents break ties in favor of the principal, when r ≥ x−yct,i∗
t
, they will
prefer to pull arm i∗t .
Conversely, in order to achieve a probability of qs for pulling the myopic arm, the principal can
choose a payment of ct,i∗t = inf{c|Fs(
x−y
c ) ≤ qs}. If Fs is continuous at
x−y
ct,i∗
t
, the probability of
myopic play (conditioned on the signal) is exactly qs, and ct,i∗t is the smallest payment achieving
this probability. If there is a discontinuity at x−yct,i∗
t
, then for every ǫ > 0, the probability of myopic
play with payment ct,i∗t + ǫ is less than qs. In that case, the principal offers a payment of ct,i∗t with
probability 1−qs1−Fs((x−y)/ct,i∗
t
) for pulling arm i
∗
t , and no payment otherwise. Now, the probability of
a myopic pull will again be exactly qs.
To express the payment more concisely, we write Fs
−1(qs) = sup{r|Fs(r) ≤ qs}. Then, the
payment can be expressed as ct,i∗t =
x−y
Fs−1(qs)
. In particular, when Fs is continuous, ct,i∗t will be
offered deterministically; otherwise, the principal randomizes.
In summary, we have shown a one-to-one mapping between desired probabilities qs for myopic
play, and payments (and possibly probabilities, in the case of discontinuities) for achieving the qs.
We write q = (qs)s∈Σ for the vector of all probabilities. The unconditional (prior) probability of
playing myopically is
∑
s∈Σ psqs, and the expected payment (x− y) ·
∑
s∈Σ ps
1−qs
Fs−1(qs)
.
We can now summarize the argument above and give a formal definition of the time-expanded
version of policy A with signaling scheme ϕ,
Definition 9 A policy TESq,A,ϕ is a time-expanded version of policy A with signaling scheme
ϕ, if at time t, after receiving the signal s about agent t’s conversion ratio, the principal chooses
(randomized) payments such that the myopic arm is pulled with probability qs, and the arm i
∗
t =
A(Sˆt) is pulled with probability 1− qs.
This can be achieved by offering the agent, with probability 1−qs1−sup{Fs(r)|Fs(r)≤qs} , a payment of
maxi E[vt,i | St]−E
[
vt,i∗
t
| St
]
Fs−1(qs)
for pulling arm i∗t .
Here, Fs(r) is the CDF of the posterior distribution of the agent’s conversion ratio conditioned
on signal s.
The key technical lemma gives a sufficient condition on q that allows us to obtain a good
approximation ratio of the Lagrangian to the optimum solely in terms of
∑
s psqs.
Lemma 10 Fix a signaling scheme ϕ. If q satisfies
∑
s∈Σ psqs ≥ λ
∑
s∈Σ ps
1−qs
F−1s (qs)
, there exists a
policy A, such that the time-expanded policy TESq,A,ϕ satisfies
R
(γ)
λ (TESq,A,ϕ) ≥ (1− γ ·
∑
s∈Σ
psqs) ·OPTγ . (4)
10As in [9], in order to facilitate the analysis, this may include myopic and non-myopic pulls of arm i. For instance,
if arm 1 was pulled as non-myopic arm at times 1 and 6, and a myopic pull of arm 1 occurred at time 3, then we
would use the state of arm 1 after the pulls at times 1 and 3.
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The proof of Lemma 10 rests heavily on variations of the following lemmas from [9]. They
are extremely straightforward modifications of Lemmas 4.2 and 3.2 from [9], and the proofs are
deferred to Appendix A.
Lemma 11 (Modification of Lemma 4.2 of [9]) Given a parameter λ and a signaling scheme
ϕ. Let ζt−1 =
∑
t′<t Zt′ be the total number of non-myopic steps performed by the time-expanded
algorithm TESq,A,ϕ prior to time t, where q satisfies
∑
s∈Σ psqs ≥ λ
∑
s∈Σ ps
1−qs
F−1s (qs)
. Then, for
any 0 ≤ n ≤ t,
ETESq,A,ϕ [vt,it − λct,it | ζt−1 = n] ≥ EA [vn,in ] .
Lemma 12 (Modification of Lemma 3.2 of [9]) Given a parameter λ and a signaling scheme
ϕ. Assume q satisfies
∑
s∈Σ psqs ≥ λ
∑
s∈Σ ps
1−qs
F−1s (qs)
, then for η = (1−p)γ1−pγ , where p =
∑
s∈Σ psqs,
we have
R
(γ)
λ (TESq,A,ϕ) ≥
1− η
1− γ
· R(η)(A).
Lemma 13 (Theorem 1.2 of [9]) Consider a fixed MAB instance (without selfish agents) with
two different time discount factors η < γ, and let OPTη,OPTγ be the optimum time-discounted
reward achievable under these discounts. Then, OPTη ≥
(1−γ)2
(1−η)2
·OPTγ, and this bound is tight.
Proof of Lemma 10. Let A be the optimal policy for the time-discount factor η = (1−p)γ1−pγ , where
p =
∑
s∈Σ psqs. We then have
R
(γ)
λ (TESq,A,ϕ)
Lemma 12
≥
1− η
1− γ
·OPTη
Lemma 13
≥
1− γ
1− η
·OPTγ
=
1− γ
1− (1− p)γ/(1− pγ)
·OPTγ = (1− pγ) ·OPTγ ,
completing the proof.
According to Lemma 10, the approximation guarantee of the time-expanded policy TES is
monotone decreasing in p =
∑
s∈Σ psqs. This suggests a natural heuristic for choosing the myopic
probabilities q: minimize p subject to satisfying the conditions of the lemma. This optimization can
be carried out using the following non-linear program. Surprisingly, this na¨ıve heuristic, motivated
predominantly by the need to cancel out terms in the proof of Lemma 10, actually gives us the
optimal approximation ratio. We will prove this in Section 4.
minimize
∑
s∈Σ psqs
subject to
∑
s∈Σ psqs ≥ λ
∑
s∈Σ ps
1−qs
F−1s (qs)
0 ≤ qs ≤ 1, for all s ∈ Σ.
(5)
First, notice that the optimization problem is feasible, because q = 1 is a trivial solution.
Whenever Fs is semi-regular,
1−x
F−1s (x)
is convex. Therefore, the feasibility region of the optimization
problem (5) is convex, and the problem can be solved efficiently [8].
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Theorem 14 Given a signaling scheme ϕ, let q∗ be the optimal solution of the convex program
(5), and p∗ the optimal value. Let η = (1−p
∗)γ
1−p∗γ . Then, TESq∗,OPTη is a (1 − p
∗γ)-approximation
policy to OPTγ .
This proves the first half of Theorem 1 in the introduction. Notice in Theorem 14 that q can
be determined without knowledge of the specific MAB instance; only the signaling scheme needs
to be known.
4 Upper bound: Diamonds in the Rough
In this section, we show that the approximation ratio 1−p∗γ is actually tight when the distribution
Fs is semi-regular, where p
∗ is the value of the convex program (5). For simplicity, when q∗ is clear
from the context, we let TES∗ denote the policy TES
q∗,OPTη where η =
(1−p∗)γ
1−p∗γ (as in Theorem
14). We will show that on a class of MAB instances called Diamonds-in-the-rough [9], the optimal
policy with payments (defined below) can achieve only a (1 − p∗γ)-fraction of OPTγ . Therefore,
not only is the analysis of TES∗’s approximation ratio tight, but TES∗ also has the optimal
approximation ratio 1− p∗γ.
Definition 15 The Diamonds-in-the-rough MAB instance ∆(B, γ) is defined as follows. Arm 1
has constant value 1 − γ. All other (essentially infinitely many) arms have the following reward
distribution:
1. With probability 1/M , the arm’s reward is a degenerate distribution of the constant (1−γ)B·M
(good state);
2. With probability 1−1/M , the arm’s reward is a degenerate distribution of the constant 0 (bad
state).
Note that if B < 1, then arm 1 is the myopic arm.
Since ∆(B, γ) is uniquely determined by B and is just one single instance, the optimal policy
that maximizes the Lagrangian objective, i.e., R(γ)(A) − λC(γ)(A), is well-defined11. We call the
policy that maximizes the Lagrangian objective the optimal policy with payments, and denote it by
OPT
(γ)
λ (∆(B, γ)).
We can solve for the optimal policy with payments using another convex program, which we next
derive. Suppose that the optimal policy with payments has time-discounted Lagrangian objective
V . In the first round, it only has two options: (a) let the agent play myopically (i.e., pull the
constant arm); (b) incentivize him to play a non-constant arm.
If option (a) is chosen and the agent pulled the constant arm, then the principal learns nothing
and faces the same situation in the second round. So conditioned on the constant arm being pulled,
the principal will get 1− γ + γV . If option (b) is chosen and a non-constant arm was pulled, then
with probability 1/M , the non-constant arm will be revealed to be in the good state, and the
principal does not need to pay any agent again, obtaining value (1 − γ)B ·M
∑∞
i=0 γ
i = B ·M ;
with probability 1 − 1/M , the non-constant arm will be revealed to be in the bad state, and the
principal faces the same situation in the second round, obtaining value γV . Recall that cs is the
11This is in contrast to the case where the performance of a policy is evaluated on a class of instances rather than
single instance.
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payment needed to ensure that the myopic arm is played with probability at most qs when signal
s is revealed. To summarize, if we set the probabilities for myopic play to (qs)s∈Σ, then V satisfies
the following equation:
V = (1− γ + γV )
∑
s∈Σ
psqs +
∑
s∈Σ
ps(1− qs)(
1
M
· B ·M + (1−
1
M
)γV − λcs). (6)
Solving for V while taking M →∞, we get (1−γ)V = (1−γ)
∑
s∈Σ psqs+
∑
s∈Σ ps(1− qs)(B−
λcs). As the difference between the expected rewards of the myopic arm and the non-myopic arm
is (1− γ)− (1− γ)B, we have cs =
(1−γ)(1−B)
Fs−1(qs)
. The optimal policy with payments needs to choose
the best myopic probabilities, which is equivalent to:
maximize (1− γ)
∑
s∈Σ psqs +
∑
s∈Σ ps(1− qs)(B − λ
(1−γ)(1−B)
Fs−1(qs)
)
subject to 0 ≤ qs ≤ 1, for all s ∈ Σ.
(7)
Notice that the objective function of program (7) is concave, so the program is convex. Let qˆ
be the optimal solution to the program (7). Denote by A(qˆ) the policy determined by qˆ. Recall
that q∗ is the solution to the following convex program:
minimize
∑
s∈Σ psqs
subject to
∑
s∈Σ psqs ≥ λ
∑
s∈Σ ps
1−qs
F−1s (qs)
0 ≤ qs ≤ 1,∀s ∈ Σ.
(5)
Note that the qˆ are probabilities for choosing the myopic arm given by the above program and
depend on a specific MAB instance, i.e., ∆(B, γ). On the other hand, q∗ is independent of any
MAB instance and only depends on the signaling scheme ϕ and F . Lemma 18 shows that for the
right choice of B, qˆ and q∗ actually coincide on the corresponding Diamonds-in-the-rough instance.
The proof relies heavily on the KKT condition [24], so we assume that 1−x
Fs−1(x)
is continuously
differentiable and use the KKT condition for differentiable functions. When derivatives do not
exists, we can use the sub-differential versions of KKT. Since we would like the characterization
to hold for countably infinite signal spaces (and thus infinitely many variables), we have to be
somewhat careful about the specific notion of differentiability, but note that standard notions such
as Gateaux Differentiability [24] can be used here.
Definition 16 (Slater condition) For a convex program with no equality constraints, the Slater
condition is met if there exists a point x such that gi(x) < 0 for all constraints i.
It to easy to check that the program (5) satisfies the Slater condition.
Theorem 17 (KKT condition for infinite dimension) Consider a program satisfying the Slater
condition: minimize f(x) subject to gi(x) ≤ 0 for i = 1, . . . ,m. If x
∗ is the local minimum, then
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there exist multipliers µi for i = 1, . . . ,m such that:
∇f(x∗) +
m∑
i=1
µi∇gi(x
∗) = 0
gi(x
∗) ≤ 0
µi ≥ 0
µi · gi(x
∗) = 0
(8)
Lemma 18 There exists a B such that the myopic probabilities given by the convex program (5)
are equal to the myopic probabilities given by program (7).
Proof. First, we observe that the boundary case qs = 0 can be safely ignored in both convex
programs (5) and (7). This is because 1
Fs−1(q)
approaches infinity as qs → 0. For program (5), this
violates the non-trivial feasibility constraint; for program (7), this is clearly sub-optimal.
Next, we prove that every local optimum q∗ is interior for convex program (5). Applying the
stationarity condition of the KKT Theorem to program (5), we know that for every s ∈ Σ, the
optimal solution q∗ satisfies:
−ps = µs + σ
(
λps
∂
∂x
1− x
Fs
−1(x)
|x=q∗s − ps
)
. (9)
Here, µs is the multiplier for the constraint 0 ≤ qs ≤ 1, and σ is the multiplier for the non-trivial
constraint. It is important that σ is a constant that is independent of any MAB instance.
Setting q∗s = 1 for all s ∈ Σ is clearly not an optimal solution as there will be slack in the
constraints and decreasing q∗s can improve the objective for program (5). Hence, there is an s ∈ Σ
such that q∗s < 1. By complementarity, µs = 0, so that −ps = σ(λps
∂
∂x
1−x
Fs−1(x)
|x=q∗s −ps). Canceling
ps, we have
∂
∂x
1−x
Fs−1(x)
|x=q∗s =
σ−1
λσ . But we know that Fs is semi-regular, so
∂
∂x
1−x
Fs−1(x)
|x=q∗s <
∂
∂x
1−x
Fs−1(x)
|x=1 = 0. (Equality is impossible, as it would imply
∂
∂x
1−x
Fs−1(x)
= 0 for x ∈ [q∗s , 1] by
definition of semi-regularity. But then, 1−x
Fs−1(x)
would not be strictly monotone, violating the fact
that Fs is non-decreasing.) Because
σ−1
λσ < 0, we infer that σ ∈ (0, 1).
On the other hand, if q∗s = 1 for some s ∈ Σ, then µs ≥ 0 and −ps = µs−σ·ps (as
∂
∂x
1−x
Fs−1(x)
|x=1 =
0), so σ ≥ 1. This would be a contradiction to σ < 1, so we infer that q∗s < 1 for every s ∈ Σ.
For program (7), we first compute the partial derivative of the objective w.r.t. qs; it is
ps
(
1− γ − λ(1− γ)(1 −B)(1− qs)
∂
∂x
1
Fs
−1(x)
|x=qs −B + λ
(1− γ)(1−B)
Fs
−1(x)
)
. (10)
Rearranging and using the fact that ∂∂x
1−x
Fs−1(x)
= (1− x) ∂∂x
1
Fs−1(x)
− 1
Fs−1(x)
, we can rewrite it as
ps
(
1− γ − λ(1− γ)(1 −B)
∂
∂x
1− x
Fs
−1(x)
|x=qs −B
)
. (11)
Let B ∈ (1−γ, 1) solve the equation 1−γ−B(1−γ)(1−B) =
σ−1
λσ . A solution exists because σ ∈ (0, 1) and
1−γ−B
(1−γ)(1−B) varies continuously from 0 to −∞ as B varies from 1− γ to 1. Notice that the constant
arm is still the myopic choice when B < 1.
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Recall that qˆ is a global, and thus local, maximum of program (7). Assume that qˆs = 1 for
some s. Then, ∂∂qs
1−x
Fs−1(x)
|x=qˆs = 0, so the partial derivative of the objective (11) w.r.t. qs will be
ps(1− γ−B), which is negative because B > 1− γ. Thus, decreasing qˆs would maintain feasibility
and increase the value of the program (7). Hence, any local maximum of the program (7) must be
an interior point as well.
In summary, both q∗ and qˆ are interior. By the KKT condition for q∗, all the µi’s are zero,
and thus ∂∂x
1−x
Fs−1(x)
|x=q∗s =
σ−1
λσ . Because qˆ is a local optimum, expression (11) must be equal to
zero, so ∂∂x
1−x
Fs−1(x)
|x=qˆs =
1−γ−B
(1−γ)(1−B) .
By the choice of B, we then obtain that ∂∂x
1−x
Fs−1(x)
|x=q∗s =
∂
∂x
1−x
Fs−1(x)
|x=qˆs =
1−γ−B
(1−γ)(1−B) . By
semi-regularity of Fs,
∂
∂x
1−x
Fs−1(x)
is negative and non-decreasing. Thus, it must be constant on the
entire interval [qˆs, q
∗
s ].
This means that the derivative (11) of the objective of program (7) is constant over the entire
interval, and we established above that it is 0 at qˆs. Thus, the objective function of program (7)
is unchanged by replacing qˆs with q
∗
s . By performing this operation for all s, we eventually obtain
that without loss of generality, qˆ = q∗.
Based on this lemma, we now prove the main theorem in this section. This also proves the
second half of Theorem 1 in the introduction.
Theorem 19 The policy TES∗, parameterized by q∗, has optimal approximation ratio 1 − p∗γ.
In particular, there exists a worst-case MAB instance in which the optimal policy with payments
achieves exactly a Lagrangian reward of a (1− p∗γ) fraction of the optimum.
Proof. Lemma 18 showed that for every signaling scheme, there is a B (a parameter of the non-
constant arms) such that q∗ and qˆ coincide on the MAB instance∆(B, γ). It remains to show that
these instances are in fact worst-case instances, i.e., that the ratio between R
(γ)
λ (A(qˆ)) and OPTγ
in ∆(B, γ) is exactly 1− p∗γ.
First note that OPTγ =
B
1−γ : once a non-constant arm is revealed to be in a good state, it is
optimal to pull that arm forever. We next show that R
(γ)
λ (A(qˆ)) =
B·(1−p∗γ)
1−γ . Thereto, we use both
convex programs and the fact that qˆ = q∗. Substituting q∗ into the objective of program (7), we
obtain the following Lagrangian reward for the time-expanded policy:
R
(γ)
λ (A(qˆ)) =
1
1− γ
(
(1− γ)
∑
s∈Σ
psq
∗
s +
∑
s∈Σ
ps(1− q
∗
s)(B − λ
(1− γ)(1−B)
Fs
−1(q∗s)
)
)
.
The non-trivial constraint of program (5) has to be tight; otherwise, the objective could be
increased by lowering individual q∗s values. Therefore,
∑
s∈Σ psq
∗
s = λ
∑
s∈Σ ps
1−q∗s
F−1s (q∗s )
, which allows
us to simplify the previous expression to
R
(γ)
λ (A(qˆ)) =
B(1− p∗γ)
1− γ
= (1− p∗γ) ·OPTγ .
Thus, on this instance, R
(γ)
λ (TES
∗) ≤ (1− p∗γ)OPTγ . By Theorem 14, this bound is tight.
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5 Full Information Revelation
Our main positive results hold for the case of countable or finite signal spaces, whereas uncountable
signal spaces lead to technical challenges. However, one important special case of uncountable signal
spaces is more easily handled, namely, when the principal learns the exact conversion ratio r, i.e.,
s = r. We show that in that case, r itself can be used as the sole randomization device, leading to
a threshold policy. In this section, we assume that the distribution F is continuous (an assumption
that was not needed in Section 3).
5.1 Optimal Time-Expanded Policy
Our first goal will be to show that the optimal time-expanded policy fixes a threshold θ and only
incentivizes agents whose conversion ratio lies above the threshold. Then, an optimization over
threshold policies is easy to carry out.
Definition 20 The threshold policy TPθ,A with threshold θ is defined as follows: When an agent
with conversion ratio r arrives, he is incentivized with suitable payment to pull i∗t = A(Sˆt) if and
only if r ≥ θ.
Lemma 21 Consider a single arm pull, and a value q ∈ [0, 1]. Among all policies that have this
arm pull be myopic with probability q, the one minimizing expected cost is a threshold policy.
Proof. Consider any policy P, and assume that q = Prob[P lets the agent play myopically].
Now, define θ = sup{r|F (r) = q}, so that F (θ) = q.
As before, we write x = maxi E [vt,i | St, Z0:t−1] and y = E
[
vt,i∗t | St, Z0:t−1
]
.
For any r, let Pr = 1 iff P incentivizes agents with conversion ratio r. The expected payment
of policy P is then
(x− y) ·
∫ ∞
0
Pr
r
dF (r) = (x− y) ·
(∫ ∞
θ
1
r
dF (r) +
∫ θ
0
Pr
r
dF (r)−
∫ ∞
θ
1− Pr
r
dF (r)
)
≥ (x− y) ·
(∫ ∞
θ
1
r
dF (r) +
∫ θ
0
Pr
θ
dF (r)−
∫ ∞
θ
1− Pr
θ
dF (r)
)
= (x− y) ·
∫ ∞
θ
1
r
dF (r),
where the last step used the definition of θ, implying that the measure (under F ) of conversion
ratio r < θ for which P incentivizes agents is the same as the measure of r > θ for which P does
not incentivize agents.
The final expression is the expected Lagrangian cost of P ′, so we have shown that P ′ has no
larger cost than P in this one round.
Lemma 22 The Lagrangian objective of any time-expanded policy P of A is (weakly) dominated
by that of a threshold policy.
Proof. Consider a time-expanded policy P. Thus, the probability q with which P lets the agent
play myopically is the same in each round. As in the proof of Lemma 21, we let θ = sup{r|F (r) = q}.
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Because F (θ) = q, in each round, the reward of P is the same as that of the threshold policy with
threshold θ.
Lemma 21 establishes that in each round, the cost of P ′ is no more than that of P; thus, the
Lagrangian objective for P ′ is at least as large as for P.
Because of Lemma 22, it suffices to study the optimal threshold policy, and determine the
correct threshold.
As before, we let x = maxi E [vt,i | St, Z0:t−1], and y = E
[
vt,i∗t | St, Z0:t−1
]
. The expected
Lagrangian reward of TPθ,A is
x · F (θ) +
∫ ∞
θ
y −
λ(x− y)
r
dF (r) = y + (x− y) · (F (θ)− λ
∫ ∞
θ
dF (r)
r
).
Because F was assumed continuous, so is H(θ) = F (θ) − λ
∫∞
θ
dF (r)
r ; and because H(0) <
0, limθ→∞H(θ) = 1, the equation F (θ) = λ
∫∞
θ
dF (r)
r has a solution θ. Fixing this choice of θ, the
expected Lagrangian payoff simplifies to y. The rest of the proof now proceeds as in the proof of
Lemma 10, yielding an approximation ratio of 1− F (θ)γ. Writing p∗ = F (θ) for the unconditional
probability of a myopic pull under TPθ,A, we obtain the same (1 − p
∗γ) approximation ratio for
the Lagrangian objective as for the case of discrete signals.
5.2 Upper Bound
As for discrete signals, we next give a Diamonds-in-the-rough instance ∆(B, γ) on which the upper
bound for any policy matches the approximation ratio of the threshold policy. Consider the choice
of the policy in the first round; it allows the agent to play myopically with some probability q. By
Lemma 21, the optimal way to implement this probability q is to choose a threshold12 θ and offer
incentives to the agent if and only if r ≥ θ. Denote by θ∗ the threshold we get for the time-expanded
policy, i.e., the solution of F (θ) = λ
∫∞
θ
dF (r)
r . Now, similar to Equation (6), the corresponding
Lagrangian objective is
V = (1− γ + γV )F (θ) +
∫ ∞
θ
(
1
M
· B ·M + (1−
1
M
)γV − λ
(1− γ)(1−B)
r
)
dF (r). (12)
Letting M →∞ and solving Equation (12), we obtain
(1− γ)V = (1− γ −B)F (θ) +B − λ(1− γ)(1 −B)
∫ ∞
θ
dF (r)
r
. (13)
Taking a derivative of Equation (13) with respect to θ suggests (note that the function may
not be differentiable, so this is merely used as a tool to suggest a useful choice) that if we set B to
solve −λ(1 − γ)(1 − B) = (1 − γ − B)θ∗, then our previously chosen threshold θ∗ will be optimal
for the instance ∆(B, γ).
We next verify that this is indeed the case. Substituting the value of B into Equation (13),
we obtain that maximizing Equation (13) is equivalent to minimizing G(θ) = 1θ∗F (θ) +
∫∞
θ
dF (r)
r .
Now, for any θ, we have
12Note that a priori, it is not clear that this threshold will not change in subsequent rounds; hence, we cannot yet
state that a threshold policy is optimal.
17
G(θ∗)−G(θ) =
(
F (θ∗)
θ∗
+
∫ ∞
θ∗
dF (r)
r
)
−
(
F (θ)
θ∗
+
∫ ∞
θ
dF (r)
r
)
=
F (θ∗)− F (θ)
θ∗
+
∫ θ
θ∗
dF (r)
r
≤
F (θ∗)− F (θ)
θ∗
+
F (θ)− F (θ∗)
θ∗
= 0.
So θ∗ is the maximizer of Equation (13) for the specific choice of B.
Thus, on this particular instance, the ratio achieved by our threshold policy matches that of
best possible policy.
6 Budgeted version
In this section, we show matching lower and upper bounds for maximizing the total expected time-
discounted reward with a budget constraint. Let b be the fraction of OPTγ that the principal is
allowed to use (i.e., the principal’s budget is b · OPTγ). Recall that p
∗(λ) is the optimal value of
the convex program (5).
Theorem 23 Given budget b ·OPTγ, there exists a policy whose approximation ratio (with respect
to OPTγ) is
min
λ
{1− p∗(λ)γ + λb}.
Proof. First, one can prove that for every p ∈ [0, 1), there exists a λ such that p∗(λ) = p. Then,
as every unconditional myopic probability p can be achieved using some λ, we can follow the same
approach in Frazier et al. [9] by taking the limit of a sequence of probabilities (pn)n that approaches
p. Here, the policy corresponding to each pn respects (or exhausts) the budget, while the policy
for p exhausts (or respects) the budget. By suitable randomization between these policies, one can
show that the approximation ratio (with respect to OPTγ) approaches minλ{1− p
∗(λ)+λb} in the
limit.
Theorem 24 Given budget b · OPTγ, the factor minλ{1− p
∗(λ)γ + λb} is tight.
Proof. Again consider the class of Diamonds-in-the-rough instances. Assume that the optimal
policy that respects the budget is A. Thus C(γ)(A) ≤ b ·OPTγ for every MAB instance.
Moreover, by Lemma 18, we know that for every Lagrangian multiplier λ, the optimal policy for
that λ and its corresponding ∆(B, γ) has Lagrangian objective value exactly (1− p∗(λ)γ) ·OPTγ .
This means that for every Lagrangian multiplier λ (and its corresponding Diamonds-in-the-
rough instance ∆(B, γ)), we have the following equivalent inequalities for all λ ∈ (0, 1),
R(γ)(A)− λC(γ)(A) ≤ (1− p∗(λ)γ) ·OPTγ
R(γ)(A) ≤ (1− p∗(λ)γ) ·OPTγ + λ · C
(γ)(A)
R(γ)(A) ≤ (1− p∗(λ)γ + λb) ·OPTγ
So
R(γ)(A) ≤ min
λ
{(1− p∗(λ)γ + λb)} ·OPTγ .
This matches the theorem above.
18
7 Reducing Concave Money Value to Linear Money Value
In this section, we show that among concave money utility functions, linear functions obtain the
worst-case approximation ratio. This shows that our assumption that agents have linear money
utility functions is without loss of generality in regard to worst-case approximation ratios. We fix
the distribution (or prior) over agents and the signaling scheme and then perform a worst-case
analysis over MAB instances. The intuition is that the rewards of an MAB instance can be scaled
up so large that only the asymptotic behavior of concave money utility functions matters.
For any money utility function µ, define rµ = limx→∞
µ(x)
x to be the limiting slope
13 of µ, and
dµ = inf{t ≥ 0 | rµx+ t ≥ µ(x) for all x ≥ 0} the minimum intercept. Thus, we ensure that for all
x:
rµx ≤ µ(x) ≤ dµ + rµx.
Fix a signaling scheme ϕ. For a given signal s and its original posterior distribution Fs over
concave functions, define two distributions over affine functions. Under D1s , each function µ is
mapped to the linear function x 7→ rµ · x. Under D
2
s , the function µ is mapped to the function
x 7→ dµ + rµ · x. We assume that D
1
s is a continuous distribution for each s.
Our proof breaks into two parts: lower bound (algorithm) and upper bound (impossibility).
Lower bound: Given the true distribution (Fs)s∈Σ over concave functions, instead compute
the optimal policy for (D1s)s∈Σ, which we denote by OPT1. Notice that OPT1 is a time-expansion
policy and only offers payment on the Gittins arm in each round.
Because rµ · x ≤ µ(x) for all x, each agent likes money more under µ than under rµ. Thus,
we can couple the choices of agents between the two distributions: each agent who plays non-
myopically under the policy for D1 can also be incentivized to do so under F using lower payments
in expectation. Therefore, the optimal policy for the true distribution can only do better.
Formally, let arm i∗ be the Gittins arm at some round t during the execution of OPT1. Suppose
that OPT1 offers a payment of p on arm i
∗ and the arm will be pulled with probability q when
agents are drawn from D1s . When agents are drawn from Fs instead, the probability qF that the
arm will be pulled is no less than q as agents like money more under µ. Then our new policy for
Fs can randomize between offering the same payment p or offering no payment so that the overall
probability of pulling i∗ under Fs is the same as that under D
1
s . In this way, we can couple the
execution of OPT1 and our new policy so that agents always make a same choices yet OPT1 offers
more payment in expectation.
Upper bound: Next we show that in the worst case, the distribution (Fs) over concave
functions does not yield a better approximation guarantee than (D1s). First, notice that by the
same argument as the previous paragraph, the principal’s utility under (Fs) is upper bounded by
her utility with the distribution (D2s)s∈Σ over affine functions. We will upper-bound the worst-case
utility under (D2s) in terms of that under (D
1
s).
Thereto, we modify the Diamonds-in-the-rough instance from Section 4, by scaling all reward
values by some large constant C. Let ξ = C(1 − γ)(1 − B) be the difference between the reward
of the myopic arm and the Gittins arm. We will prove that for some carefully chosen constant C,
the optimal policy with payments for D2 cannot achieve much more than the optimum for D1. Let
(cs)s be the payments offered under different signals under the optimal solution for D
2.
13As µ is concave, this limit always exists and is finite.
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By the argument preceding the program (7), the optimum solution for D2 maximizes
C(1−γ)·
∑
s
ps ·Prob(r,d)∼D2s [r ·cs+d ≤ ξ]+
∑
s
ps ·(1−Prob(r,d)∼D2s [r ·cs+d ≤ ξ])(C ·B−λcs), (14)
while the optimum solution for D1 maximizes
C(1− γ) ·
∑
s
ps · Probr∼D1s [r · cs ≤ ξ] +
∑
s
ps · (1− Probr∼D1s [r · cs ≤ ξ])(C · B − λcs). (15)
Now, for any arbitrarily small ǫ, focus on a finite set Σ′ of signals which together contribute at
least a (1 − ǫ) fraction of the optimum utility under both D1 and D2. Note that such a set must
always exist, because we assumed that the signal space is countable; by sorting the signals by their
contribution and taking prefixes in this ordering, we see that the total utility of these prefixes must
converge to the overall total utility as the size of the prefix grows.
For each individual signal s, the optimal cs →∞ as C →∞. Thus, because Σ
′ is finite, for any
desired lower bound α, there exists a C such that cs ≥ α for all s ∈ Σ
′. Similarly, for any ǫ > 0,
there is a (sufficiently large) β such that Prob(r,d)∼D2s [d ≤ β] ≥ 1 − ǫ holds simultaneously for all
s ∈ Σ′. Given a target ǫ, we first choose a suitable β, and then choose C to ensure that α ≫ β.
Then, we get that for all s ∈ Σ′,
Prob(r,d)∼D2s [rcs + d ≤ ξ] = Prob(r,d)∼D2s [r ≤
ξ − d
cs
]
≥ (1− ǫ) · Prob(r,d)∼D2s [r ≤
ξ
cs
−
β
α
]
= (1− ǫ) · Probr∼D1s [r ≤
ξ
cs
−
β
α
].
Because we assumed that D1s is continuous for each s, we obtain that for each s, by choosing α≫
β large enough (ensured by making C large enough), Probr∼D1s [r ≤
ξ
cs
− βα ] ≥ Probr∼D1s [r ≤
ξ
cs
]− ǫ.
By choosing C as the maximum of the corresponding values, this inequality holds simultaneously
for all s. In summary, we obtain that
Prob(r,d)∼D2s [rcs + d ≤ ξ] ≥ Probr∼D2s [rcs ≤ ξ] + 2ǫ.
Substituting this inequality into the objective value (14) shows that the objective values (14)
and (15) differ by at most∑
s
ps · (|C(1− γ −B)| · 2ǫ+ λβ) = |C(1− γ −B)| · 2ǫ+ λβ.
The optimum value of the objective (15) grows at least linearly in C. The reason is that when C
is scaled up by any constant ν, a feasible solution is obtained by scaling all cs up by ν as well; this
results in a multiplicative increase of ν in the objective value. Thus, the best cs values must attain
at least such an increase. Because the error term C(1− γ −B)2ǫ+ λβ is at most O(ǫ) ·OPT(D1),
we obtain that
OPT(D2) ≤ OPT(D1) · (1 +O(ǫ)).
Finally, adding in the O(ǫ) terms for signals not considered in this argument does not change the
above conclusion. Making ǫ arbitrarily small (and scaling the Diamonds-in-the-Rough instance
correspondingly) then shows in the limit that the distributions over linear and affine functions have
the same worst-case behavior.
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8 Garbling of Signaling Schemes
In this section, we show that if we garble a signaling scheme ϕ into ϕ′, the optimal approximation
ratio for the garbled signaling scheme ϕ′ cannot improve. By “garbling,” we mean (stochastically)
mapping each signal in ϕ to a random (new) signal in ϕ′. Marschak and Miyasawa [26] gave the
following14 formal definition (rephrased to fit our model):
Definition 25 Let ϕ,ϕ′ be signaling schemes with respective signal spaces Σ,Σ′. Then, ϕ′ is a
garbling of ϕ if for all conversion ratios r and signals s ∈ Σ, s′ ∈ Σ′: fs,s′(r) = fs(r), where fs(r)
is the pdf of conversion ratio r conditioned on signal s.
As one can see, the garbled signaling scheme ϕ′ contains less information than the original sig-
naling scheme ϕ. Recall that 1−p∗(ψ)γ gives the optimal approximation ratio when the underlying
(exogenous) signaling scheme is ψ. Intuitively, more informative signaling schemes should give raise
to better approximation ratios, i.e. 1 − p∗(ϕ)γ ≥ 1 − p∗(ϕ′)γ if ϕ′ is garbled from ϕ. Theorem 3,
restated here, confirms this intution.
Theorem 3 Let ϕ and ϕ′ be two signaling schemes such that ϕ′ is a garbling of ϕ. Then,
1− p∗(ϕ)γ ≥ 1− p∗(ϕ′)γ.
Proof. Let ps, ps′ be the unconditional probabilities of observing signals s, s
′, as defined in Sec-
tion 2.3, and let (qs′)s′∈Σ′ be the optimal solution for program (5) with signaling scheme ϕ
′. We
will show that the program (5) for signaling scheme ϕ has a feasible solution (qs)s∈Σ such that∑
s∈Σ psqs =
∑
s′∈Σ′ ps′qs′. This implies that the policy with the garbled signaling scheme cannot
outperform the policy with the original signaling scheme.
Let ps,s′ be the (joint) probability that signal s is revealed by ϕ and signal s
′ is revealed by the
garbling ϕ′. Thus, ps′ =
∑
s∈Σ ps,s′. Conditioned on the two revealed signals s, s
′, let qs,s′ be the
probability that the policy with parameters (qs′)s′∈Σ (which only observes s
′) obtains a myopic arm
pull. Notice that this probability depends on s: while s does not affect the threshold that is set by
the policy, it does affect the distribution of the agent’s conversion ratio, and hence the probability
of a myopic pull. Thus, the overall probability of a myopic pull with signal s′ can be obtained by
summing over all (unobserved) signals s as ps′qs′ =
∑
s∈Σ ps,s′qs,s′.
Since qs′ is a feasible solution of (5), we have
∑
s′∈Σ′
ps′qs′ ≥ λ
∑
s′∈Σ′
ps′
1− qs′
F−1s′ (qs′)
.
Substituting ps′ =
∑
s∈Σ ps,s′ and qs′ =
∑
s∈Σ ps,s′qs,s′
ps′
, we can write
ps′ ·
1− qs′
F−1s′ (qs′)
=
ps′
F−1s′ (qs′)
· (1−
∑
s∈Σ ps,s′qs,s′
ps′
) =
∑
s∈Σ
ps,s′ ·
1− qs,s′
F−1s′ (qs′)
.
Next, we observe that F−1s (qs,s′) = F
−1
s′ (qs′), as follows: because ϕ
′ is a garbling of ϕ, we get
that the conditional distributions satisfy Fs(r) = Fs,s′(r). F
−1
s′ (qs′) =: τ is a threshold chosen
by the mechanism with knowledge solely of s′, chosen to achieve a probability of myopic play of
14There are several equivalent definitions, of which we have chosen the one most suitable for our purposes.
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exactly qs′. qs,s′ denotes the probability of myopic play with this threshold τ , with the additional
knowledge that the ungarbled signal was s. Thus, we obtain that qs,s′ = Fs,s′(τ) = Fs(τ), by the
garbling property. Taking inverses now shows that F−1s′ (qs′) = τ = F
−1
s (qs,s′).
Now define the target probabilities for the ungarbled signals as follows: qs =
∑
s′∈Σ′
ps,s′
ps
· qs,s′.
We can then write
∑
s∈Σ
psqs =
∑
s∈Σ
∑
s′∈Σ′
ps,s′qs,s′
=
∑
s′∈Σ′
∑
s∈Σ
ps,s′qs,s′
≥ λ
∑
s′∈Σ′
∑
s∈Σ
ps,s′ ·
1− qs,s′
F−1s (qs,s′)
= λ
∑
s∈Σ
∑
s′∈Σ′
ps ·
ps,s′
ps
·
1− qs,s′
F−1s (qs,s′)
(∗)
≥ λ
∑
s∈Σ
ps ·
1−
∑
s′∈Σ′
ps,s′
ps
qs,s′
F−1s (
∑
s′∈Σ′
ps,s′
ps
· qs,s′)
= λ
∑
s∈Σ
ps ·
1− qs
F−1s (qs)
.
Here, the inequality labeled (*) followed by semi-regularity of Fs. The inequality derived above
implies that qs is a feasible solution of (5) with signaling scheme ϕ, and it attains at least the same
utility for the principal. This completes the proof of the theorem.
9 Conclusions
We showed that the framework recently proposed by Frazier et al. [9] can be generalized to the case
when different agents have different and non-linear tradeoffs for money vs. utility derived from arm
pulls. While the generalized framework does not result in as clean a characterization of feasible
regions as the original work of Frazier et al. [9], it nonetheless holds true that time-expanded
versions of Gittins index policies are optimal in the worst case, and that worst-case examples are
of the simple “Diamond-in-the-rough” form.
We needed to assume a technical condition called semi-regularity for our results. Whether
time-expanded policies are optimal in the absence of this condition is open.
There are many natural ways in which the model of Frazier et al. [9] coul dbe further generalized.
Perhaps most intriguingly, in the model, agents only interact with the mechanism once, whereas
it would be natural to assume that the same agents return multiple times. A natural model here
would be one of the principal and just one agent, who has a different (steeper) time discount γ′ < γ
than the principal, and must be incentivized to pull arms with more foresight. In this sense, we
analyzed the special case γ′ = 0.
This direction appears quite a bit more difficult to analyze. If agents may return more than
once, this opens the door for strategic behavior; it seems possible that an agent may choose a
particular arm to pull to help or prevent the principal from learning, in turn affecting possible
future payments. This makes this model quite a bit more complicated to analyze.
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If one were to try and take the model into a direction of more realism, one could consider
specifics of some of the applications listed in the introduction, such as that of an online retailer. In
that case, one may have to account for the fact that agents who receive a payment (i.e., discount)
on a product may alter their perception or rating of the product.
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A Missing Proofs
Lemma 7 Let G be the CDF of a non-negative random variable, and define G−1(x) := sup{t ≥
0 : G(t) ≤ x}. If G−1(x)(1− x) is concave, then 1−x
G−1(x)
is convex. In particular, regularity implies
semi-regularity.
Proof. We only need to look at 3 points x, αx + (1 − α)y and y, where 0 ≤ x < y ≤ 1. Let
z = αx+ (1− α)y By concavity of G−1(x)(1 − x), we have
G−1(z)(1 − z) ≥ αG−1(x)(1− x) + (1− α)G−1(y)(1 − y) (16)
Rearranging, we have:
0 ≥ α(1 − x)
G−1(x)−G−1(z)
G−1(z)
+ (1− α)(1 − y)
G−1(y)−G−1(z)
G−1(z)
(17)
By monotonicity of G−1, G−1(x) ≤ G−1(z) ≤ G−1(y). This implies
0 ≥ α(1− x)
G−1(x)−G−1(z)
G−1(x)
+ (1− α)(1 − y)
G−1(y)−G−1(z)
G−1(y)
, (18)
as G−1(x) ≤ G−1(z) and G−1(y) ≥ G−1(z). One can see that inequality (18) is equivalent to the
convexity of 1−x
G−1(x)
.
The proofs are very straightforward (syntactic) modifications of those of the corresponding
lemmas in [9], we include them here for completeness.
Lemma 11 (Modification of Lemma 4.2 of [9]) Given a parameter λ and a signaling scheme
ϕ. Let ζt−1 =
∑
t′<t Zt′ be the total number of non-myopic steps performed by the time-expanded
algorithm TESq,A,ϕ prior to time t, where q satisfies
∑
s∈Σ psqs ≥ λ
∑
s∈Σ ps
1−qs
F−1s (qs)
. Then, for
any 0 ≤ n ≤ t,
ETESq,A,ϕ [vt,it − λct,it | ζt−1 = n] ≥ EA [vn,in ] .
Proof. The Lagrangian utility at time t is vt,it − λct,it . Let x = maxi E [vt,i | St, Z0:t−1] and
y = E
[
vt,i∗t | St, Z0:t−1
]
, where Z0:t−1 = (Z0, Zt, . . . , Zt−1). Since the myopic arm is played with
probability qs, the expected Lagrangian utility will be
ETESq,A,ϕ [vt,it − λct,it | St, Z0:t−1] =
∑
s∈Σ
ps(qsx+ (1− qs)(y − λ
x− y
F−1s (qs)
))
= y
∑
s∈Σ
ps + (x− y)
∑
s∈Σ
ps(qs −
λ(1− qs)
F−1s (qs)
) ≥ y.
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The last inequality above is due to x ≥ y (by the myopic arm preference) and
∑
s∈Σ psqs ≥
λ
∑
s∈Σ ps
1−qs
F−1s (qs)
(by assumption of the lemma). Notice the condition
∑
s∈Σ psqs ≥ λ
∑
s∈Σ ps
1−qs
F−1s (qs)
in the statement of the lemma allowed us the cancel out the myopic arm-rewards x, which would
otherwise have been difficult to analyze. Now we have
ETESq,A,ϕ [vt,it − λct,it | St, Z0:t−1] ≥ ETESq,A,ϕ
[
vt,i∗t | St, Z0:t−1
]
.
Since the expected reward only depends on the current state of arm St, we can add the status
of previous round to the condition,
ETESq,A,ϕ [vt,it − λct,it | S0:t, Z0:t−1] ≥ ETESq,A,ϕ
[
vt,i∗t | S0:t, Z0:t−1
]
.
Taking conditional expectation on both sides with the condition Sˆt, ζt−1 = n,
ETESq,A,ϕ
[
ETESq,A,ϕ [vt,it − λct,it | S0:t, Z0:t−1] | Sˆt, ζt−1 = n
]
≥ ETESq,A,ϕ
[
ETESq,A,ϕ
[
vt,i∗t | S0:t, Z0:t−1
]
| Sˆt, ζt−1 = n
]
.
Since Sˆt, ζt−1 = n is measurable by S0:t, Z0:t−1, we can use the tower property of conditional
expectations and get
ETESq,A,ϕ
[
vt,it − λct,it | Sˆt, ζt−1 = n
]
≥ ETESq,A,ϕ
[
vt,i∗t | Sˆt, ζt−1 = n
]
.
Let τ ≥ t be the next time when TESq,A,ϕ performs a non-myopic pull. Since the re-
ward sequence for each arm forms a Martingale, and i∗u is fixed with a certain Sˆt, we have that
ETESq,A,ϕ
[
vu,i∗u | Sˆt, ζt−1 = n
]
is identical for all u ≥ t. Writing ETESq,A,ϕ
[
vτ,i∗τ | Sˆt, ζt−1 = n
]
with the law of total probability, we have
ETESq,A,ϕ
[
vτ,i∗τ | Sˆt, ζt−1 = n
]
=
∑
u≥t
Prob[τ = u] · ETESq,A,ϕ
[
vu,i∗u | Sˆt, ζt−1 = n, τ = u
]
= ETESq,A,ϕ
[
vt,i∗t | Sˆt, ζt−1 = n
]
.
So far, we have proved that
ETESq,A,ϕ
[
vt,it − λct,it | Sˆt, ζt−1 = n
]
≥ ETESq,A,ϕ
[
vτ,i∗τ | Sˆt, ζt−1 = n
]
.
Taking conditional expectations with respect to ζt−1 = n, then applying the law of iterated
expectation,
ETESq,A,ϕ [vt,it − λct,it | ζt−1 = n] ≥ ETESq,A,ϕ
[
vτ,i∗τ | ζt−1 = n
]
.
Note the right-hand side is exactly EA [vn,in ] by definition of TESq,A,ϕ, finishing the proof.
Lemma 12 (Variation of Lemma 3.2 of [9]) Given a parameter λ and a signaling scheme ϕ.
Assume q satisfies
∑
s∈Σ psqs ≥ λ
∑
s∈Σ ps
1−qs
F−1s (qs)
, then for η = (1−p)γ1−pγ , where p =
∑
s∈Σ psqs, we
have
R
(γ)
λ (TESq,A,ϕ) ≥
1− η
1− γ
· R(η)(A).
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Proof.
R
(γ)
λ (TESq,A,ϕ) =
∞∑
t=0
γtETESq,A,ϕ [vt,it − λct,it ]
=
∞∑
t=0
∞∑
n=0
γtETESq,A,ϕ [vt,it − λct,it | ζt−1 = n] · Prob[ζt−1 = n]
Lemma 11
≥
∞∑
n=0
EA [vn,in ] ·
∞∑
t=0
γt · Prob[ζt−1 = n]
=
∞∑
n=0
EA [vn,in ] ·
∞∑
t=0
γt ·
(
t
n
)
· (1− p)npt−n
=
∞∑
n=0
EA [vn,in ] · γ
n(1− p)n ·
∞∑
i=0
(
n+ i
n
)
· (γp)i
=
∞∑
n=0
EA [vn,in ] · γ
n(1− p)n · (1− γp)−(n+1)
=
∞∑
n=0
EA [vn,in ] ·
1− η
1− γ
· ηn.
In the penultimate step, we use
∑∞
i=0
(
n+i
n
)
xi = (1− x)−(n+1) for n ≥ 0 and |x| < 1.
B Impossibility of Exploration with Reward-Dependent Payments
In this section, we show that if the payment scheme is a function only of the arm reward obtained
by the agent, it can be impossible to incentivize the agent to pull the optimal arm.
We use a slightly modified “Diamonds in the Rough” instance∆(B, γ), by changing the myopic
arm to two arms. Both of them produce i.i.d. rewards from a known distribution. The distributions
are showed in Table 1:
Reward Arm 1 outputs reward with probability Arm 2 outputs reward with probability
(1− γ)B ·M (1 + ǫ)/M (1− ǫ)/M
0 1− (1 + ǫ)/M 1− (1− ǫ)/M
Table 1: Distributions of myopic arms
We emphasize that this is not the type of arm with degenerate distribution that produces an
initially unknown constant reward.
Also we keep the infinite supply of arms with degenerate distribution. Recall the definition as
follows,
1. With probability 1/M , the arm’s reward is a degenerate distribution of the constant (1 −
γ)B ·M (good state);
2. With probability 1 − 1/M , the arm’s reward is a degenerate distribution of the constant 0
(bad state).
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Because the payment function can depend only on the reward that the agent obtained, it is
completely characterized by the payment pH in response to obtaining (1−γ)B ·M and the payment
pL in response to obtaining 0. When (1− γ)B ·M + pH ≥ pL, we have
((1− γ)B ·M + pH) ·
1 + ǫ
M
+ pL ·
(
1−
1 + ǫ
M
)
≥ ((1− γ)B ·M + pH) ·
1
M
+ pL · (1−
1
M
);
otherwise, we have
((1− γ)B ·M + pH) ·
1− ǫ
M
+ pL ·
(
1−
1− ǫ
M
)
≥ ((1− γ)B ·M + pH) ·
1
M
+ pL · (1−
1
M
).
So the expected utility of pulling the optimal arm is always weakly dominated by one of two
myopic arms. Therefore, there is no way to incentivize the agent to pull the optimal arm.
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